A translation of the accord between the Colombian Government and the FARC concerning a bilateral ceasefire, and the demobilization and disarmament of the insurgent group. On the 23rd of June 2016 the delegations of the National Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-Army of the People (FARC-EP) jointly announced a set of accords addressing most of the remaining points on the agenda of peace negotiations between the respective parties, which stipulate how some of the most problematic aspects of the concrete measures to be taken to implement a final peace agreement will be resolved.
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Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Colombia
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Studies in Political Economy
Despite the 2016 agreement between the government and the FARC-EP guerrillas, Colombia is still far from achieving peace. Throughout much of the country, violence goes on unabated. Under the Leftist presidency of Gustavo Petro, the chances of Columbia's armed conflict being brought to a close have increased. To accomplish "total peace," however, the government must implement the FARC-EP peace agreement, restart the peace negotiations with the ELN guerrillas, and dismantle Right-wing neoparamilitary groups and drug cartels.
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Oct. 4, 2016-On October 2, by a very narrow margin, Colombians voted to reject the agreement that their government had negotiated with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) that would have formally ended that group's 52-year long struggle to overthrow that nation's government. The result came as a shock to many both within and outside Colombia, given that polls taken shortly before the referendum predicted the accord would pass by an almost two-to-one margin. [3] Indeed, in our confidence that the referendum would pass, had written and were waiting to go to press with a detailed article on the outlook for post-agreement Colombia. Interpreting the results The October 2 vote does not reflect Colombia's rejection of peace, but rather, of an accord that many Colombians believed would bring neither peace nor justice. Colombians have long become accustomed to the breach between the erudite discourse of their leaders, and the realities of their daily lives. The rejected 297-page long accord was a good example of this contrast. Beyond the language used by the government to encourage acceptance of the agreement, a number of its provisions threatened to both worsen the security situation and exacerbate the difficulties of the Colombian economy. In the agreement, the FARC had committed to demobilize less than 6.000 combatants, when the total number of guerrillas, including affiliated forces, were estimated to be 15,000 or more. The agreement had thus presented the risk that a significant part of the FARC's clandestine networks would have remained active following the demobilization process. In addition, the agreement committed to the distribution of some 9 million hectares of land, requiring the expropriation of numerous private properties that likely would have significantly expanded social conflict in the rural areas. Finally, the cost of implementing the accord was calculated to be around US$30 billion over ten years-a figure which is not realistic at all given the situation of the Colombian economy, which is already under severe fiscal pressures, due to low international oil prices and other factors. Further adding to the understanding by Colombians that the agreement would not have brought " peace, " the nation's other principal terrorist group, the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN), with its 2,500 armed combatants, was clearly poised to continue the fight, and indeed was alreadymoving into areas vacated by the FARC. In a post-agreement environment, the ELN was likely to become even stronger in military terms through flows of FARC personnel and material into its own organization. Colombians were further aware that former FARC members not participating in the accords would create a new generation of criminal bands which would increase the threat represented by such groups that already are a public security menace just as violent as the FARC and ELN. On October 2, not enough Colombians could suspend disbelief, based on the experiences of their adult lives, that, in the words of the referendum, the agreement would " end the conflict and construct a stable and enduring peace. " Controversial elements of the agreement, such as providing 10 non-elected seats for members of the FARC in the Colombian Congress for the periods following the 2018 and 2022 elections, a transitional justice system which many believed would allow the FARC to avoid serious punishment for serious crimes committed during the conflict, and the payment of benefits to demobilized fighters that exceeded what many Colombians themselves earned, certainly helped mobilize Colombians against the accord as well. The vote highlights the strength of Colombian democracy and institutions, despite their imperfections. It is notable that some 13 million ballots were cast, and yet definitive results were available within two hours of the election. The result was decided by a difference of less than half a percentage point (50.2% to 49.8%), and yet within minutes of the confirmation of results, President Santos publicly accepted the defeat of the core initiative of his presidency. Santos did not claim fraud, or try to rally his supporters to protest the results, or ask the Supreme Court to declare a recount. An ambiguous strategic scenario The rejection of the accords unleashes a significant wave of uncertainty in Colombia, but we believe, presents a strategic situation less grave and more manageable, than had the accords been approved.
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Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Colombia Transitioning from Violence
In this chapter we analyze the Transitional Justice framework defined by the peace agreement between the FARC-EP and the Colombian government. In analyzing the Transitional Justice framework, we will examine the principles that inspired the agreement on victims and four of the mechanisms described in it: The Truth Commission, the Unit for Searching for disappeared people, the measures for reparation considered, and the guarantees of non-repetition stated. In addition, we will analyze the Special Jurisdiction for Peace. In the final section, we will analyze some possible scenarios for the future of the implementation of the Transitional Justice agreements, reflecting on the uncertainties surrounding the implementation of the agreements and how its implementation can provide for legal stability (or instability) for different constituents and for the peace project in Colombia.
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One year after the peace accord between the Colombian government of Juan Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, signed on November 24, 2016, its implementation is making no headway. This article examines the main obstacles to the materialization of the peace accord, from its difficult incorporation in Colombian law, to concrete problems identified by peasant organizations and NGOs that defend the victims of the conflict. Issues of power-sharing, security and land are at the core of present difficulties.
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This article examines the likelihood that the signing of peace accords in Colombia between the government and the FARC rebels will not produce peace, but rather, an escalation of violence as some dissident FARC members pass into the hands of Colombia's second largest terrorist insurgency, the ELN, while others offer their services to criminal bands, as already appears to be occurring. The findings, based on off-the-record conversations with numerous security experts in Colombia, raises concerns about the ability of the Colombian security forces to effectively confront the threat in a "post-agreement" environment in which both Colombian society and international partners expect decreased military activity and associated spending as part of the "peace dividend," even while the government's ability to finance military operations comes under pressure from low international oil prices and a weak Colombian peso.
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Colombian Peace Agreement
This introductory chapter is divided into three sections. The first one provides background on the Colombian conflict, the content of the Final Agreement, and its implementation challenges. The second section summarizes the content of the chapters and highlights some relationships among them. The brief third section offers some editorial notes.
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UCL Institute of the Americas Policy Brief
On 30 November UCL-IA published a Policy Brief on the current peace talks between the government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-Peoples’ Army (FARC-EP). This brief was prepared by Andrei Gomez Suarez and Par Engstrom. The authors convened a group of experts at the UCL Institute of the Americas on 26 October 2012 to discuss the prospects for a negotiated end to the Colombian armed conflict. Executive summary After successive past attempts to reach peace agreements there are important reasons to be optimistic that the current talks between the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-Peoples’ Army (FARC-EP) may lead to a political solution of the armed conflict in Colombia. A close examination of the ongoing peace talks suggests that a confluence of factors provides a window of opportunity for negotiations, including a positive international context, on-going structural reforms in Colombia, and the willingness of the parties to focus on a limited negotiating agenda. There are nonetheless two key issues of concern that may derail the incipient peace process: first, is the Santos administration able to ensure the support of influential regional elites in Colombia? Such support will be central for the provision of political guarantees and security of demobilised FARC members. Second, will the FARC leadership be able to prevent the splintering of the organisation? The fragmentation of FARC could potentially increase violence, which could not only transform the armed conflict, but also directly affect the process of ensuring the political participation of FARC following the signing of a peace agreement.
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